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Abstract
Online content platforms are concerned about the freshness of their content updates to their end cus-
tomers, and increasingly more platforms now invite and pay the crowd to sample real-time information
(e.g., traffic observations and sensor data) to help reduce their ages of information (AoI). How much
crowdsourced data to sample and buy over time is a critical question for a platform’s AoI management,
requiring a good balance between its AoI and the incurred sampling cost. This question becomes more
interesting by considering the stage after sampling, where multiple platforms coexist in sharing the
content delivery network of limited bandwidth, and one platform’s update may jam or preempt the
others’ under negative network externalities. When these selfish platforms know each other’s sampling
cost, we formulate their competition as a non-cooperative game and show they want to over-sample to
reduce their own AoIs, causing the price of anarchy (PoA) to be infinity. To remedy this huge efficiency
loss, we propose a trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment in a repeated game to enforce the
platforms’ cooperation to approach the social optimum. We also study the more challenging scenario
of incomplete information that some new platform hides its private sampling cost information from the
other incumbent platforms in the Bayesian game. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that even the platform
with more information may get hurt. We successfully redesign the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to
negate the platform’s information advantage and ensure no cheating. Our extensive simulations show that
the mechanisms can remedy the huge efficiency loss due to platform competition, and the performance
improves as we have more incumbent platforms with known cost information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today many customers do not want to lose any breaking news or useful information in
smartphone even if in minute, and online platforms (such as social media outlets and navigation
applications) want to keep their content updates fresh to attract a good number of customers
for subscription and profit ([2], [3]). The platforms’ updated real-time information can be news,
traffic conditions, shopping promotions, restaurant discovery, and air quality conditions.
Age of information (AoI) is a promising metric to characterize a platform’s content update
delay from an application layer point of view, and AoI measures the duration from the moment
that the latest content was generated to the current reception time [4]. Numerous works were
done to analyze the AoI for a single link ([4]–[7]). ([8]–[10]) also analyzed the benefit of using
queues to store outdated packets and improved the average age by choosing sampling rate.
[11] extended the long-run AoI analysis to the case of multiple sources in a last-come-first-serve
(LCFS) M/M/1 queue with given preemption policy. ([12], [13]) optimized the online scheduling
policy to balance multiple sources without knowing future data arrival patterns.
The existing works on AoI focus on technological issues for controlling time-avarage age under
different policies and scenarios (e.g., [4]–[13]), and very few studies look at the economics of
AoI management at the platform or system level. We are only aware that [14] studied how a
single platform dynamically motivates sensors to sample fresh data on the source side, and [15]
analyzed the purchase behavior to buy a platform’s fresh data on the demand side. From the
system management perspective, there are two critical issues to address. First, on the supply
side, a platform needs to take care of the large sampling cost to support AoI. Increasingly more
platforms now invite and pay the crowd to sample and send back real-time information (e.g.,
traffic observations, sales information, and sensor data) at large sampling rates [16]. For example,
online platform CrowdSpark follows this crowdsourcing approach and maintains a large pool of
professional and citizen journalists who are paid to submit reports, news and videos. Another
example is Waze platform who asks and rewards millions of drivers to report location-based
3observations (e.g., of road visibility, congestion, and “black-ice” segments) when travelling in
different routes of the city ([17], [18]). We wonder how much crowdsourced data a platform
should buy, expecting a balance between its AoI performance and the incurred sampling cost.
The other economic issue is on the delivery side, where more than one selfish platform shares
the same content delivery network for managing their individual AoIs. The content delivery
network is of limited bandwidth and naturally involves competition among multiple platforms
([19], [20]). One platform’s content update can jam or preempt the others’ information updates,
reducing its own AoI at the cost of the others’. How to enforce their cooperation despite the selfish
nature of each is another key question, requiring new mechanism design under negative network
externalities. In the literature, there are some game-theoretic studies on duopoly competition
under externalities without mechanism design ([21], [22]). [23] further studied direct pricing
or subsidy-based mechanisms to seek duopoly cooperation, yet such direct payment may be
difficult to implement and realize in practice. For example, in our AoI management problem, it
is difficult to ask the platforms to pay additionally according to their sample updates on top of
their existing contracts with the Internet service provider (ISP). Regarding the literature of indirect
(non-monetary) cooperation mechanism design for wireless networking applications, there are
some repeated game studies that proposed trigger mechanisms of long-term punishment to hinder
any platform’s deviation from cooperation (e.g., [24], [28]). Yet these mechanisms are proposed
for complete information or require sufficiently large discount factor when each platform cares
enough for its future return. Differently, we design new trigger-and-punishment mechanisms here
to work for any discount factor and incomplete information scenario. We also note that there
are some pure economics studies on repeated games under incomplete information (e.g., [25]),
yet they focus on signalling and learning and are not directly suitable for our problem of AoI
management.
Our key novelty and main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Regulating AoI competition under network externalites: To our best knowledge, this is the
first paper studying the platform competition in AoI, and we take into account their sampling
costs on the information supply side and update competition on the information delivery
side. In Section II, we model multiple selfish platforms’ competition as non-cooperative
4games, depending on how well the platforms know about each other’s sampling cost.
• Huge efficiency loss due to platform competition: Under complete information, each platform
competes to increase its sampling rate without caring the others’ AoI increases, and we prove
the price of anarchy (PoA) is infinity. Under incomplete information where some platform
newly joining the information market can hide its sample cost realization from the other
incumbent platforms in the Bayesian game, we show surprisingly that the new platform
may get hurt from gaining more information and the PoA is also infinity.
• Trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment for approaching the social optimum under
complete information: To remedy the huge efficiency loss under complete information, in
Section III we design a trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment in the repeated game
to enforce the platforms to cooperate, where we adapt the platforms’ sampling cooperation
profile for fitting any discount factor. As the discount factor increases, the mechanism’s
achieved performance improves to approach the social optimum as the platforms are more
forward-looking to cooperate.
• Approximate trigger-and-punishment mechanism design under incomplete information: To
reduce the efficiency loss between the Bayesian competition equilibrium and the social op-
timum under incomplete information, in Section IV we propose an approximate mechanism
in the repeated game to enforce all the platforms’ cooperation. Note that our mechanism
under complete information does not work here, as the new platform now can take advantage
of hiding its cost information to strategically under- or over-sample without triggering
the punishment. We successfully redesign the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to negate
the platform’s information advantage and ensure no cheating. We show the mechanism’s
performance improves as we have more incumbent platforms with known cost information.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
As shown in Figure 1, N online platforms (e.g., Crowdspark and Waze) first collect new
samples (e.g., reports of spotted news and traffic observations) from their crowdsourcing pools
at Poisson rates λ1, λ2, · · · , λN , respectively, and then share the ISP’s content delivery network of
limited bandwidth µ to update new content to their customers in the same area. Here λi denotes
5Fig. 1: Illustration of System Model. For example, here N = 2 platforms (Crowdspark and
Waze) respectively buy samples from their crowdsourcing pools at Poisson rates λ1 and λ2, and
then update to their end customers through the same delivery network of bandwidth µ.
the mean rate of sampling generation of new information for platform i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. As in
many of the AoI literature (e.g., [11], [26], [27]), we assume in each platform’s crowdsourcing
pool, the sampling from each sensor source over time follows a Poisson process, and the total
sampling to platform i observations as superposition also follows Poisson process with mean
rate λi. Platform i can control mean rate λi by providing proper incentive compensation to
the crowdsourcing pool as in [14] and [16], and its average sampling cost is ciλi with unit
compensation cost ci.
After sampling, we consider the content transmission time through the delivery network
follows an exponential distribution with rate µ. Without much loss of generality, we assume
that the content delivery network applies a LCFS M/M/1 queue with preemption policy for
processing the N platforms’ updates as in [11], where the latest content arrival can preempt any
platform’s ongoing update in the network.1 According to [11], the time-average AoI at platform
i is given by
1Though more involved, our model and the following analysis can also be extended to other queueing models such as a
first-come-first-serve M/M/1 in [4]. There, the time-average AoI expression still shows the benefit of a platform to increase its
sampling rate at the cost of increasing the other platforms’ AoIs.
6∆i =
N∑
j=1
λj
λi
(
1
N∑
j=1
λj
+
1
µ
),
which decreases with its own sampling rate λi and network bandwidth µ, and increases with the
other platforms’ total sampling rate λ−i =
N∑
j=1
λj − λi under negative network externalities.
By further taking our modeled sampling cost into consideration, we define platform i’s total
cost function as
pii(λi, λ−i) = ∆i + ciλi, (1)
requiring platform i to balance the AoI and the sampling cost when deciding its λi. Unlike each
platform who only aims to minimize its own cost objective, the social planner wants to minimize
the social cost as defined below:
pi(λ1, λ2, · · · , λN) =
N∑
i=1
pii(λi, λ−i).
In practice, a platform knows its own sampling cost yet may or may not know the other
platforms’ costs exactly. Next we present our preliminary results for the N platforms’ competition
equilibrium under complete and incomplete information.
A. Competition Equilibrium under Complete Information
We first consider the information scenario that each cost ci is known to all the N platforms.
We formulate the N platforms’ interaction in the non-cooperative one-shot game where platform
i decides its own λi to minimize its total cost pii(λi, λ−i) in (1) without considering the others’
AoIs. As outcome of this game, we denote (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) as the equilibrium sampling rates.
To tell the maximum efficiency loss due to their selfish competition, we use the concept of
price of anarchy (PoA) below:
PoA = max
c1,c2,··· ,cN ,µ
pi(λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N)
pi(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
,
where (λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) denote the social optimizers when the N platforms cooperate to jointly
minimize the social cost. By checking the first-order conditions of convex costs pi(λ1, · · · , λN)
and pii(λi, λ−i) with respect to λi for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, we have the following result.
7Proposition II.1. Under complete information, the social optimizers (λ∗∗1 , λ∗∗2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) are the
unique solutions to
− 1
λ2i
(1 +
N∑
j=1
λj − λi
µ
) + ci +
1
µ
( N∑
j=1
1
λj
− 1
λi
)
= 0, i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. (2)
Differently, the competition equilibrium (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) are the unique solutions to
− 1
λ2i
(1 +
N∑
j=1
λj − λi
µ
) + ci = 0, i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. (3)
By comparing (2) and (3), we conclude that competition leads over-sampling (λ∗i ≥ λ∗∗i ) for
platform i ∈ {1, · · · , N} at the equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix A. We notice from the third-term on the left-hand-side of
(2) that at the social optimum platform i cares about its sampling’s negative externality effect
1
µ
( N∑
j=1
1
λj
− 1
λi
)
on the other N−1 platforms and will sample conservatively, while this is missing
in (3) due to platform i’s selfishness at the equilibrium. The following result further explains
their competition to over-sample at the equilibrium.
Corollary II.1.1. At the competition equilibrium, λ∗i increases with λ∗j , and decreases with ci,
cj and µ, respectively, where i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N} and j 6= i.
Intuitively, each platform worries that its update is preempted by the other platforms, and
will sample and update more frequently. Such competition causes huge efficiency loss, as shown
below.
Proposition II.2. Price of anarchy under complete information is PoA=∞, which is achieved
when the smallest sampling cost among all the platforms min{c1, · · · , cN} tends to be zero and
the largest sampling cost among all the platforms max{c1, · · · , cN} is non-trivial.
Proof. Suppose ci = min{c1, · · · , cN} and cj = max{c1, · · · , cN}, we need to prove PoA=∞
given ci → 0 and non-trivial cj > 0. As ci → 0, platform i does not care its sampling cost
and only aims to minimize its AoI. According to (3), λ∗i will go to infinity and this stimulates
platform j’s λ∗j =
√
1+(
N∑
k=1
λ∗k−λ∗j )/µ
cj
to reach infinity. However, at the social optimum, both
(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) in (2) and the resultant social cost pi(λ∗∗1 , λ∗∗2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) are finite. Then we
8have
PoA = lim
ci→0
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
λ∗l
λ∗k
(
1
N∑
l=1
λ∗l
+ 1
µ
)
+
N∑
l=1
clλ
∗
l
pi(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
≥ lim
ci→0
cjλ
∗
j
pi(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
=∞.
This huge efficiency loss motivates us to design non-monetary cooperation mechanisms to
mitigate the competition among the platforms. Note that the social optimum can be easily realized
if the social planner (e.g., the ISP) can charge a monetary penalty 1
µ
( N∑
j=1
1
λ∗∗j
− 1
λ∗∗i
)
per sampling
rate λi from platform i, where i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. However, this additional charging based on
usage is intrusive and difficult to implement in practice, given the content platforms’ existing
flat contracts with the ISP. This motivates us to design non-monetary cooperation mechanisms
in the repeated game in Section III, which is more challenging.
B. Competition Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Now we consider the incomplete information scenario that there is 1 newly joined platform
in the network (namely, platform 1) whose unit sampling cost is time-varying and its realization
is only known to itself, while the other N − 1 existing platforms know each other’s sampling
cost exactly and are uncertain about that of the new platform.2 Accordingly, we model the
public information that platform 1 has probability pH of having high sampling cost cH and
probability 1 − pH of having low sampling cost cL each time it samples, while sampling cost
ci of platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N} is constant over time. On one hand, platform 1 knows its c1
realization (cL or cH) and the other ci’s. On the other hand, platform i only knows all costs ci’s
and the probability distribution of c1, and it is also aware of platform 1’s information advantage.
In other words, the ratio 1/N tells the degree of incomplete information to the social planner
or public. We wonder if platform 1 benefits from this and if we have huge efficiency loss
result as in complete information. To let platform 1 fully uses its information advantage, we
consider a more challenging case where unit sampling costs of platforms follow the order of
pHcH + (1− pH)cL ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cN with smallest mean cost for platform 1.
2We can also extend our analysis to another incomplete scenario where more than one platform can hide its cost information
from the others, though the analysis involving many combinations of cost realizations becomes more complicated.
9Since platform 1 knows its own unit cost exactly, it will take this information advantage and
adaptively decide λ1(cH) when c1 = cH and λ1(cL) when c1 = cL. Unaware of c1 realizations,
platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N} behaves indifferently to decide λi constantly over time. We model such
platform competiton as a Bayesian game as follows.
Given c1 = cH , platform 1’s cost function is
pi1
(
λ1 (cH) ,
N∑
i=2
λi
)
=
λ1 (cH) +
N∑
i=2
λi
λ1 (cH)
 1
λ1 (cH) +
N∑
i=2
λi
+
1
µ
+ cHλ1 (cH) , (4)
and otherwise,
pi1
(
λ1 (cL) ,
N∑
i=2
λi
)
=
λ1 (cL) +
N∑
i=2
λi
λ1 (cL)
 1
λ1 (cL) +
N∑
i=2
λi
+
1
µ
+ cLλ1 (cL) . (5)
Under incomplete information, the cost function of platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N} is defined below
in average sense:
pii ((λ1 (cH) , λ1 (cL)) , λi, λ−i) = pH ·
(
λ1 (cH) + λi + λ−i
λi
(
1
λ1 (cH) + λi + λ−i
+
1
µ
))
+ (1− pH) ·
(
λ1 (cL) + λi + λ−i
λi
(
1
λ1 (cL) + λi + λ−i
+
1
µ
))
+ ciλi, (6)
where λ−i =
N∑
j=2
λj − λi. The average social cost function is
pi ((λ1 (cH) , λ1 (cL)) , λ2, · · · , λN) =pHpi1
(
λ1 (cH) ,
N∑
i=2
λi
)
+ (1− pH) pi1
(
λ1 (cL) ,
N∑
i=2
λi
)
+
N∑
i=2
pii ((λ1 (cH) , λ1 (cL)) , λi, λ−i) . (7)
Similar to the complete information scenario, we present the concept of PoA below in this
incomplete information scenario:
PoA = max
cL,cH ,c2,··· ,cN ,µ,pH
pi ((λ∗1 (cH) , λ
∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N)
pi ((λ∗∗1 (cH) , λ
∗∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
,
where ((λ∗1 (cH) , λ
∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) summarize competition equilibrium and social optimizers
are summarized as ((λ∗∗1 (cH) , λ
∗∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ). By checking the first-order conditions of
convex costs pi1
(
λ1 (cH) ,
N∑
i=2
λi
)
in (4), pi1
(
λ1 (cL) ,
N∑
i=2
λi
)
in (5), pii((λ1 (cH) , λ1 (cL)) , λi,
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λ−i) in (6) and pi ((λ1 (cH) , λ1 (cL)) , λ2, · · · , λN) in (7) with respect to λ1(cH), λ1(cL) and λi,
i ∈ {2, · · · , N}, respectively, we have the following result.
Proposition II.3. Under incomplete information, ((λ∗∗1 (cH) , λ∗∗1 (cL)) , λ∗∗2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) as the so-
cial optimizers are the unique solutions to
− 1
λ21 (cH)
1 +
N∑
i=2
λi
µ
+ cH + 1µ
N∑
i=2
1
λi
= 0, (8)
− 1
λ21 (cL)
1 +
N∑
i=2
λi
µ
+ cL + 1µ
N∑
i=2
1
λi
= 0, (9)
pH
− 1λ2i
1 +
λ1 (cH) +
N∑
j=2
λj − λi
µ
+ ci + 1λ1 (cH)µ

+ (1− pH)
− 1λ2i
1 +
λ1 (cL) +
N∑
j=2
λj − λi
µ
+ ci + 1λ1 (cL)µ
+ 1µ
( N∑
j=2
1
λj
− 1
λi
)
= 0, (10)
where i ∈ {2, · · · , N}. Differently, the competition equilibrium ((λ∗1 (cH) , λ∗1 (cL)) , λ∗2, · · · , λ∗N)
are the unique solutions to
− 1
λ21 (cH)
1 +
N∑
i=2
λi
µ
+ cH = 0, (11)
− 1
λ21 (cL)
1 +
N∑
i=2
λi
µ
+ cL = 0, (12)
− pH
λ2i
1 +
λ1 (cH) +
N∑
j=2
λj − λi
µ
− 1− pHλ2i
1 +
λ1 (cL) +
N∑
j=2
λj − λi
µ
+ ci = 0, (13)
where i ∈ {2, · · · , N}. All the platforms will over-sample at equilibrium, i.e., λ∗1(cH) ≥ λ∗∗1 (cH),
λ∗1(cL) ≥ λ∗∗1 (cL) and λ∗i ≥ λ∗∗i . Additionally, we have λ∗1(cH)/λ∗1(cL) =
√
cL/cH .
The proof is given in Appendix B. Similar to the complete information scenario, all the
platforms unnecessarily over-sample at competition equilibrium. Such competition also causes
huge efficiency loss, as shown below by following a similar proof of Proposition II.2.
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Proposition II.4. Price of anarchy under incomplete information is PoA=∞, which is achieved
when the smaller cost cL of platform 1 tends to be zero while some ci with i ∈ {2, ..., N} is
non-trivial.
Proof. We want to show PoA= ∞ given cL → 0 and non-trivial some ci > 0 for platform
i ∈ {2, ..., N}. As cL → 0, platform 1 does not care its sampling cost when c1 = cL and only
aims to minimize its AoI, which is decreasing in λ1(cL) according to (5). Thus optimal λ∗1(cL)
will go to infinity.
As ci > 0 is non-trivial, λ∗1(cL) going to infinity stimulates platform i’s sampling rate λ
∗
i as
λ∗i =
√
1+(pHλ
∗
1(cH)+(1−pH)λ∗1(cL)+
N∑
j=2
λ∗j−λ∗i )/µ
ci
to reach infinity. However, at the social optimum,
both ((λ∗∗1 (cH) , λ
∗∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) in (8)-(10) and the resultant social cost pi((λ∗∗1 (cH),
λ∗∗1 (cL)), λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) are finite. Then we have
PoA = lim
cL→0
pH
λ∗1(cH)
(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ∗j/µ) +
1−pH
λ∗1(cL)
(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ∗j/µ) + (1− pH)cLλ∗1(cL) +
N∑
j=2
cjλ
∗
j
pi((λ∗∗1 (cH), λ
∗∗
1 (cL)), λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
+
N∑
j=2
1
λ∗j
(
1 +
(
pHλ
∗
1(cH) + (1− pH)λ∗1(cL) +
N∑
k=2
λ∗k − λ∗j
)
/µ
)
+ pHcHλ
∗
1(cH) +N/µ
pi((λ∗∗1 (cH), λ
∗∗
1 (cL)), λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
≥ ciλ
∗
i
pi((λ∗∗1 (cH), λ
∗∗
1 (cL)), λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
=∞.
If the social planner or ISP can charge 1
µ
N∑
i=2
1
λ∗∗i
per update from platform 1 and pH
λ∗∗1 (cH)µ
+
1−pH
λ∗∗1 (cL)µ
+ 1
µ
( N∑
j=2
1
λ∗∗j
− 1
λ∗∗i
)
from platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N}, then the social optimum can be
achieved. However, this additional charging based on usage is intrusive and difficult to implement
in practice, given the content platforms’ existing flat contracts with the ISP. This motivates us
to design non-monetary cooperation mechanisms in the repeated game in Section IV, which is
more challenging.
Finally, we check platform 1’s equilibrium cost objective and wonder if it takes advantage
from knowing more information of its own cost realization.
Proposition II.5. Under incomplete information, the one-shot cost of platform 1 when c1 = cH
is greater than that under complete information, and once pH is large, even its time-average cost
12
pHpi1(λ
∗
1(cH), λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) + (1 − pH)pi1(λ∗1(cL), λ∗2, · · · , λ∗N) becomes greater than that under
complete information.
The proof is given in Appendix C. Under complete information, when c1 = cH platform 1
does not want to sample much to save its sampling cost, and platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N} knowing
c1 = cH expects weak limited negative network externalities from platform 1 and also samples
conservatively. However, under incomplete information, platform i can no longer observe c1 = cH
or c1 = cL instances, and its over-sampling when c1 = cH forces platform 1 to over-sample,
intensifying the competition and hurting all. Once pH is large, this happens more often and even
platform 1 loses on average sense.
III. TRIGGER-AND-PUNISHMENT MECHANISM UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
To remedy the huge inefficiency with PoA=∞ proved in Proposition II.2, we want to stimulate
cooperation between the N platforms. Without direct pricing or penalty, this is difficult to enforce
in one-shot, and thus we propose to use an infinitely repeated game to shift the N platforms’
myopic decision-making to be more forward-looking in the long run. In this repeated game, all
the platforms will simultaneously play the non-cooperative one-shot game in Section II.A for
infinitely many rounds with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Note that δ tells how much a platform
evaluates its one-shot cost in next round as compared to the current cost. Yet this repeated
game alone is not enough to ensure cooperation, as each platform will still behave the same
as (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (3) in each round. We next propose a trigger mechanism of indirect
punishment as credible threat to prevent their myopic over-sampling in the first place. Note that
a platform’s AoI decreases with its update and increases with the other platforms’ updates under
negative network externalities.
Definition III.1. Our non-forgiving trigger mechanism of indirect punishment under complete
information works in the following:
• In each round, each platform follows cooperation profile
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ),· · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
to sample
13
if none was ever detected to deviate from this profile in the past.3
• Once a deviation was found in the past, the N platforms will keep playing the equilibrium
profile (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (3) forever as punishment.
We expect the social planner (e.g., the ISP) to implement the cooperation mechanisms and
recommend the cooperation or punishment profile to platforms based on their operations over-
time. Our mechanism as described above has another advantage: to trigger the punishment, we
do not need to identify which platform deviates. One can imagine that as long as a platform
cares enough for future costs under a large discount factor δ, it is unlikely to deviate to trigger
severe punishment. It should be noted that in the extreme case of δ → 0, each platform only
cares for immediate cost and
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ),· · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
degenerate to (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in the
one-shot game. We next design the cooperation profile
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ),· · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
according to
any value of non-trivial δ.
A. Cooperation Profile Design for Large δ Regime
In this subsection, we first suppose the social optimum is attainable via our repeated game
with
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ),· · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
= (λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) in (2), then any platform’s deviation will
bring itself in a larger long-term cost. We can use this no-deviation condition to reverse-engineer
the feasible regime of δ for enabling such (λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) in the first place.
If platform i ∈ {1, · · · , N} chooses to deviate to any λi, it is optimal to deviate in the
first round to save the immediate cost pii(λi, λ∗∗−i) in (1) without any time discount. Its optimal
deviation or best response to λ∗∗−i is λi =
√
1+λ∗∗−i/µ
ci
according to (3). Its (discounted) long-term
cost objective over all time stages is
Πˆi = pii
(√
1 + λ∗∗−i/µ
ci
, λ∗∗−i
)
+ δpii(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) + δ
2pii(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) + · · · ,
= pii
(√
1 + λ∗∗−i/µ
ci
, λ∗∗−i
)
+
δ
1− δpii(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i), (14)
3Here, each time slot in the repeated game is long enough for each platform’s AoI statistic to converge to its average value.
Then platform i can easily identify the other platforms’ total sampling rate λ−i from its own average AoI experience ∆i(λi, λ−i)
in (1) and rate λi. Note that each platform only has intention to over-sample. As long as one platform really over-samples, λ−i
increases and all the other platforms can infer deviation to trigger the punishment.
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where punishment is triggered since time stage 2 and λ∗−i =
N∑
j=1
λ∗j − λ∗i . Otherwise, it will
always cooperate and obtain the following cost without any deviation,
Πi = pii(λ
∗∗
i , λ
∗∗
−i) + δpii(λ
∗∗
i , λ
∗∗
−i) + δ
2pii(λ
∗∗
i , λ
∗∗
−i) + · · · =
1
1− δpii(λ
∗∗
i , λ
∗∗
−i). (15)
To ensure that platform i never deviates in the repeated game, we require Πˆi ≥ Πi, or simply
δ ≥ δthi :=
pii(λ
∗∗
i , λ
∗∗
−i)− pii
(√
1+λ∗∗−i/µ
ci
, λ∗∗−i
)
pii(λ∗i , λ
∗
−i)− pii
(√
1+λ∗∗−i/µ
ci
, λ∗∗−i
) =
(√
1+λ∗∗−i/µ
ci+
1
µ
( N∑
j=1
1
λ∗∗
j
− 1
λ∗∗
i
) −√1+λ∗∗−i/µci )2
2λ∗∗i
(
λ∗i −
√
1+λ∗∗−i/µ
ci
) . (16)
Without loss of generality, we assume c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cN and can show that platform 1 is more
likely to deviate with δth1 ≥ δth2 ≥ · · · ≥ δthN . The following summarizes the trigger mechanism
with perfect cooperation profile for δ ≥ max(δth1 , δth2 , · · · , δthN ) = δth1 .
Proposition III.2 (Large δ Regime). Under complete information, if δ ≥ δth1 with δthi=1 in
(16), all the platforms will follow the perfect cooperation profile (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)) =
(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) in (2) all the time, without triggering the punishment profile (λ∗1, λ∗2, · · · , λ∗N)
in (3).
The threshold δthi tells platform i’s unwillingness to cooperate and we prefer small threshold
for this platform to follow λ∗∗i ideally.
B. Cooperation Profile Design for Medium δ Regime
If δthj+1 ≤ δ < δthj , where j ∈ {1, · · · , N−1}, platform k ∈ {j+1, · · · , N} will still follow the
social optimizer λ∗∗k yet platform i ∈ {1, · · · , j} with smaller costs will deviate, requiring us to
design new λ˜i(δ) as a function of δ to replace λ∗∗i for such platforms. By ensuring the long-term
cost Πi(λ˜i(δ), λ−i(δ)) in (15) without deviation just equal to (14) with the best deviation, where
λ−i(δ) =
j∑
k=1
λ˜k(δ)− λ˜i(δ) +
N∑
k=j+1
λ∗∗k , we optimally determine the λ˜i(δ) by jointly solving the
following equations
δ =
pii(λ˜i(δ), λ−i(δ))− pii
(√
1+λ−i(δ)/µ
ci
, λ−i(δ)
)
pii(λ∗i ,
N∑
j=1
λ∗j − λ∗i )− pii
(√
1+λ−i(δ)/µ
ci
, λ−i(δ)
) , i ∈ {1, · · · , j}. (17)
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When solving (17), there are two candidates for λ˜i(δ) and we choose to take the smaller root
with smaller social cost. Then we have the following result.
Proposition III.3 (Medium δ Regime). In the repeated game under complete information, if
δthj+1 ≤ δ < δthj , where j ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}, all the platforms will always follow the cooperation
profile below without deviating to trigger punishment (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (3):
• For platform k ∈ {j + 1, · · · , N} with larger unit sampling costs: λ˜k(δ) = λ∗∗k .
• For platform i ∈ {1, · · · , j}: (λ˜1(δ), · · · , λ˜j(δ)) are unique solutions to
δλ∗i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
−
√√√√(
δλ∗i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
)2
− 1 +
λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
− λ˜i(δ) = 0.
Here, λ∗∗i < λ˜i(δ) < λ
∗
i and λ˜i(δ) decreases with δ.
The proof is given in Appendix D. As we prefer the platforms not to over-sample, a larger δ
in the medium regime helps.
C. Cooperation Profile Design for Small δ Regime
If δ is smaller than the smallest threshold δthN , no platform will follow the social optimizers,
and we need to design totally new
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
as functions of δ jointly. Similar
to (17), we now have
δ =
pii(λ˜i(δ), λ˜−i(δ))− pii
(√
1+λ˜−i(δ)/µ
ci
, λ˜−i(δ)
)
pii(λ∗i , λ
∗
−i)− pii
(√
1+λ˜−i(δ)/µ
ci
, λ˜−i(δ)
) , i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (18)
where λ˜−i(δ) =
N∑
j=1
λ˜j(δ) − λ˜i(δ) and λ∗−i =
N∑
j=1
λ∗j − λ∗i . After solving (18) and taking the
smaller roots for all λ˜i(δ)’s to avoid large social cost, we have the following result.
Proposition III.4 (Small δ Regime). In the repeated game under complete information, if
δ < δthN with i = N in (16), all the platforms will always follow the cooperation profile(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
below as unique solutions to
λ˜i(δ)− δλ∗i − (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜−i(δ)
µ
ci
+
√√√√(
δλ∗i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜−i(δ)
µ
ci
)2
− 1 +
λ˜−i(δ)
µ
ci
= 0, (19)
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Fig. 2: Cooperation profile (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ)) of the trigger mechanism versus the discount factor
δ, as compared to social optimizers (λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 ). Here N = 2, δ
th
2 = 0.3 and δ
th
1 = 0.7 under
parameters c1 = 1, c2 = 1.5 and µ = 1.
where λ˜−i(δ) =
N∑
j=1
λ˜j(δ)−λ˜i(δ). Here we have λ∗∗i < λ˜i(δ) ≤ λ∗i for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. As δ →
0, the proposed
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
approach (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (3), and the repeated
game degenerates to one-shot game. As δ increases, cooperation profile
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
decrease and the competition mitigates.
The proof is given in Appendix E. Figure 2 shows an illustrative example of N = 2 platforms.
It shows how cooperation profile (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ)) under our trigger mechanism of non-monetary
punishment changes with discount factor δ in all the three δ regimes. In small δ regime (δ < 0.3),
both (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ)) decrease with δ until δth2 = 0.3 with λ˜2(δ) = λ
∗∗
2 . In medium δ regime
(0.3 ≤ δ < 0.7), only λ˜1(δ) decreases with δ until δth1 = 0.7. Finally, in large δ regime (δ ≥ 0.7),
the profile always equals (λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 ). The results are consistent with Propositions III.2-III.4.
Under our optimized trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment, one may wonder how
the efficiency loss due to platform competition changes with discount factor δ in all the three
δ regimes. Given the symmetric cost setting (c1 = c2 = · · · = cN ), δth1 = · · · = δthN and there
are only small and large δ regimes. In this case, we manage to analytically derive the following
result.
Corollary III.4.1. Given c1 = c2 = · · · = cN under complete information, the ratio between the
social costs under the trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment and the social optimum
17
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Fig. 3: Ratio between the social costs under our trigger-and-punishment mechanism and the
social optimum under complete information. We fix N = 2, c1 = 1, c2 = 1.5 and change
bandwidth µ and δ.
decreases with δ until δ = δth1 = · · · = δthN and keeps constant 1 since then.
Proof. As platforms perform the same in each round of the repeated game under our mechanism
and the social optimum, it is enough to examine the social cost ratio in one shot. Recall that under
the social optimum, λ∗∗1 = λ
∗∗
2 = · · · = λ∗∗N = 1√c1 according to (3) and c1 = c2 = · · · = cN , the
corresponding social cost is
pi∗∗ =
N∑
i=1
(
1
λ∗∗i
(
1 +
N∑
j=1
λ∗∗j /µ
)
+ ciλ
∗∗
i
)
= 2N
√
c1 + 2N/µ,
which is independent of δ. Under our optimal trigger mechanism, λ˜1(δ) = λ˜2(δ) = · · · = λ˜N(δ)
decreases with δ until δ = δth1 = · · · = δthN and keeps constant since then, and the corresponding
social cost is
pir =
N∑
i=1
(
1
λ˜i(δ)
(
1 +
N∑
j=1
λ˜j(δ)/µ
)
+ ciλ˜i(δ)
)
= Nc1λ˜1(δ) +N/λ˜1(δ) + 2N/µ.
In the large δ regime, pir = pi∗∗ and we only need to examine the regime of small δ < δth1 ,
where λ˜1(δ) > λ∗∗1 =
1√
c1
always holds according to (19). By taking the first derivative of pir
over λ˜1(δ), we have
dpir
dλ˜1(δ)
= Nc1 − N
λ˜21(δ)
> 0,
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due to λ˜1(δ) > 1√c1 . Therefore, pi
r increases with λ˜1(δ). According to Proposition III.4, λ˜1(δ)
decreases with δ for δ < δth1 , thus pi
r decreases with δ for δ < δth1 . Since pi
∗∗ is a constant with
δ, we have the ratio pir/pi∗∗ decreases with δ < δth1 and keeps 1 after δ ≥ δth1 .
Figure 3 further examines the asymmetric cost c1 < c2 for the two-platform case. We can
see that the the ratio between social costs under the trigger mechanism and the social optimum
still decreases with δ, which is consistent with Corollary III.4.1. As bandwidth µ increases, we
expect smaller social cost ratio or smaller efficiency loss, as the two platforms’ competition over
bandwidth mitigates given more resource.
IV. APPROXIMATE TRIGGER-AND-PUNISHMENT UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
To remedy the huge inefficiency with PoA= ∞ in Proposition II.4, we want to stimulate
cooperation among the N platforms to approach the social optimum under incomplete informa-
tion. As introduced in Section II.B, platform 1’s sampling cost realization in each instance is
unknown to platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N}. Similar to the complete information in Section III, we
propose to use an infinitely repeated game, where all the platforms will simultaneously play
the Bayesian game for infinitely many rounds with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Without any
trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment, each platform will still behave the same as
((λ∗1 (cH) , λ
∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (11)-(13) in each round. However, we cannot employ our
non-forgiving trigger mechanism under complete information in Definition III.1, by using the
social optimal cooperation profile
((
λ˜1 (cL, δ) , λ˜1 (cH , δ)
)
, λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
. The reason is
that under incomplete information, the other platforms cannot tell in each round whether platform
1’s cost c1 is cH or cL and platform 1 can choose λ˜1(cL) when c1 = cH without triggering any
punishment. Even if δ is large enough to allow (λ˜1(cL, δ), λ˜1(cH , δ))=(λ∗∗1 (cL), λ
∗∗
1 (cH)), the
following lemma shows that platform 1 may not comply.
Lemma IV.1. Given the perfect cooperation profile (λ∗∗1 (cL), λ∗∗1 (cH)) for platform 1 under
sufficiently large δ, platform 1 can still deviate from λ∗∗1 (cH) to λ
∗∗
1 (cL) when c1 = cH .
The proof is given in Appendix F. Once choosing between λ∗∗1 (cL) and λ
∗∗
1 (cH) in each round
of the repeated game, platform 1 will not trigger any punishment. When c1 = cH , platform i ∈
{2, · · · , N} under-samples with λ∗∗i by considering platform 1’s average cost under incomplete
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information, and platform 1 can take the information advantage to sample at high rate λ∗∗1 (cL)
by using low AoI to justify its high sample cost.
To negate information advantage of platform 1 under incomplete information, we next propose
to blindly use platform 1’s (deterministic) average cost to design its cooperation profile. That
is, we recommend an approximate term λ˜1(δ) to platform 1 all the time, without alternating
between precise terms λ˜1(cL, δ) and λ˜1(cH , δ) over time to give platform 1 freedom to cheat.
Definition IV.2. Our approximate trigger mechanism of indirect punishment under incomplete
information is as follows:
• In each round, all the platforms follow
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
to sample as approximate
cooperation profile if none was ever detected to deviate from this profile in the past.
• Once a deviation was found in the past, all the platforms will keep playing the equilibrium
profile ((λ∗1 (cH) , λ
∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (11)-(13) forever as punishment.
One can imagine that even if δ is sufficiently large, this approximate cooperation profile is
still different from social optimizers ((λ∗∗1 (cH) , λ
∗∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N ) in (8)-(10) and there is
inevitably some efficiency loss to avoid platform 1’s cheating by using information advantage.
We next design the best cooperation profile
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
according to any value
of non-trivial δ and minimize the involved inefficiency.
A. Approximate Cooperation Profile Design for Large δ Regime
Under incomplete information, platform 1 will behave indifferently no matter c1 = cH or
c1 = cL in the repeated game. Then we can revise the social optimum in (8)-(10) by treating
platform 1’s cost constant as cˆ1 := pHcH + (1− pH)cL deterministically. Then we approximate
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the social optimum as unique solutions to:
λˆ1 =
√√√√√√√
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
pHcH + (1− pH) cL + 1µ
N∑
i=2
1
λˆi
, (20)
λˆi =
√√√√√√√√
1 +
(
N∑
j=1
λˆj − λˆi
)
/µ
ci +
1
µ
(
N∑
j=1
1
λˆj
− 1
λˆi
) , i ∈ {2, · · · , N}. (21)
By comparing (20)-(21) with (8)-(10), we have the following result.
Lemma IV.3. Using approximation to smooth out sampling variation of platform 1, all the
platforms will under-sample as compared to the social optimum. That is,
λˆ1 ≤ pHλ∗∗1 (cH) + (1− pH)λ∗∗1 (cL), λˆi ≤ λ∗∗i , i ∈ {2, · · · , N}.
Given (λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN) in (20)-(21) are attainable now and any platform’s deviation from them
will clearly bring itself in a larger long-term cost. We can analyze the no-deviation condition to
reverse-engineer the feasible regime of large δ for enabling (λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN) in the first place.
When c1 = cL, if platform 1 chooses to deviate in the first round to save the immediate cost
pi1
(
λ1,
N∑
i=2
λˆi
)
in (1) without any time discount, its optimal deviation or best response to
N∑
i=2
λˆi
is λ1 =
√
1+
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
cL
according to (3). Its (discounted) long-term cost objective over all time
stages is
Πˆ1 (cL) = pi1

√√√√√1 + N∑i=2 λˆi/µ
cL
,
N∑
i=2
λˆi
+ δ1− δpi1 ((λ∗1 (cL) , λ∗1 (cH)) , λ∗2, · · · , λ∗N) .
Otherwise, it will obtain the following cost without any deviation,
Π1 (cL) = pi1
(
λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN |c1 = cL
)
+
δ
1− δpi1
(
λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN
)
.
To ensure that platform 1 never deviates when c1 = cL in the repeated game, we require Πˆ1(cL) ≥
Π1(cL), or simply δ ≥ δˆth1 (cL) with
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δˆth1 (cL) :=
cLλˆ1 − 2
√(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
)
cL +
(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
)
/λˆ1
(cL − cˆ1) λˆ1 + 2
√
1 +
N∑
i=2
λ∗i /µ (pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL)− 2
√(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
)
cL
. (22)
Similarly, we require the following to ensure no deviation when c1 = cH :
δ ≥ δˆth1 (cH) :=
cH λˆ1 − 2
√(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
)
cH +
(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
)
/λˆ1
(cH − cˆ1) λˆ1 + 2
√
1 +
N∑
i=2
λ∗i /µ (pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL)− 2
√(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λˆi/µ
)
cH
. (23)
Given platform 1 always chooses λˆ1, we also require the following for platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N}
to follow λˆi:
δ ≥ δˆthi :=
√√√√ ci+ 1µ( N∑
j=1
1
λˆj
− 1
λˆi
)
ci
+
√
ci
ci+
1
µ
(
N∑
j=1
1
λˆj
− 1
λˆi
) − 2
2
√√√√√√1+
(
pHλ
∗
1(cH)+(1−pH)λ∗1(cL)+
N∑
j=2
λ∗j−λ∗i
)
/µ
1+
(
N∑
j=1
1
λˆj
− 1
λˆi
)
/µ
− 2
. (24)
Recall that pHcH + (1 − pH)cL ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cN , we have δˆthN ≤ · · · ≤ δˆth2 ≤ max{δˆth1 (cH),
δˆth1 (cL)} := δˆth1 . Yet note that min{δˆth1 (cH), δˆth1 (cL)} may or may not be larger than δˆth2 .
Proposition IV.4 (Large δ Regime). Under incomplete information, if δ ≥ δˆth1 = max{δˆth1 (cH),
δˆth1 (cL)}, all the N platforms will follow the approximate cooperation profile (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · ,
λ˜N(δ)) = (λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN) in (20)-(21) all the time, without triggering punishment ((λ∗1 (cH),
λ∗1 (cL)), λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (11)-(13).
When all the platforms have the same average costs, i.e., pHcH +(1−pH)cL = c2 = · · · = cN ,
we can analytically prove the following proposition.
Proposition IV.5. Given symmetric costs pHcH + (1− pH)cL = c2 = · · · = cN among the plat-
forms, the approximation ratio achieved by our trigger mechanism with profile (λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN)
in (20)-(21) is N
N−1 as compared to the social optimum with ((λ
∗∗
1 (cH) , λ
∗∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗∗
2 , · · · , λ∗∗N )
in (8)-(10). The mechanism’s performance improves as we have more incumbent platforms with
known cost information.
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The proof is given in Appendix G. Given only platform 1 with hidden cost, relatively we face
less information uncertainty as total platform number N increases.
B. Approximate Cooperation Profile Design for Medium δ Regime
If δˆthj ≤ δ < δˆthj−1, where j ∈ {2, · · · , N}, only platform k ∈ {j, · · · , N} will still follow
perfect approximate profile λˆk in (20). Yet platform 1 will deviate when c1 = cL given δ <
max{δˆth1 (cH), δˆth1 (cL)}, and platform i ∈ {2, · · · , j − 1} will also deviate from λˆi, requiring us
to design new λ˜1(δ) and λ˜i(δ). Similar to (22), (23) and (24), we need to ensure the platform
1’s long-term cost does not change after the best immediate deviation no matter whether c1 = cL
or c1 = cH , and ensure platform i’s long-term cost does not change after the best immediate
deviation. The we have the following.
Proposition IV.6 (Medium δ Regime). In the repeated game under incomplete information,
if δˆthj ≤ δ < δˆthj−1 for some j ∈ {2, · · · , N}, all the N platforms will always follow the
cooperation profile below without deviating to trigger ((λ∗1 (cH) , λ
∗
1 (cL)) , λ
∗
2, · · · , λ∗N) in (11)-
(13) as punishment:
• For platform k ∈ {j, · · · , N} with greater costs: λ˜k(δ) = λˆk in (20)-(21).
• For platform 1 and platform i ∈ {2, · · · , j−1}, their cooperation profile (λ˜1(δ), · · · , λ˜j−1(δ))
to follow are the unique solutions to:
λ˜1(δ) = max
{ML −
√√√√M2L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)
(
1 +
(
j−1∑
k=2
λ˜k(δ) +
N∑
k=j
λˆk
)
/µ
)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL ,
MH −
√√√√M2H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)
(
1 +
(
j−1∑
k=2
λ˜k(δ) +
N∑
k=j
λˆk
)
/µ
)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH
}
,
λ˜i(δ)−
Mi −
√√√√M2i − ci
(
1 +
(
j−1∑
k=1
λ˜k(δ)− λ˜i(δ) +
N∑
k=j
λˆk
)
/µ
)
ci
= 0,
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where
ML = δ
√√√√1 + N∑
i=2
λ∗i /µ (pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL) + (1− δ)
√√√√√
1 +
j−1∑
k=2
λ˜k(δ) +
N∑
k=j
λˆk
 /µ
 cL,
MH = δ
√√√√1 + N∑
i=2
λ∗i /µ (pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL) + (1− δ)
√√√√√
1 +
j−1∑
k=2
λ˜k(δ) +
N∑
k=j
λˆk
 /µ
 cH ,
Mi =
√
ci(δ
√√√√1 + (pHλ∗1 (cH) + (1− pH)λ∗1 (cL) + N∑
k=2
λ∗k − λ∗i )/µ
+ (1− δ)
√√√√√1 +
j−1∑
k=1
λ˜k(δ)− λ˜i(δ) +
N∑
k=j
λˆk
 /µ).
The proof is given in Appendix H.
C. Approximate Cooperation Profile Design for Small δ Regime
If δ is smaller than the smallest threshold δˆthN among the platforms, no platform will follow
cooperation profile (λˆ1, λˆ2, · · · , λˆN) in (20)-(21), and we need to redesign new
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · ,
λ˜N(δ)
)
jointly as functions of δ. Similarly, we need to design the cooperation profile such that
the platforms’ long-term discounted costs do not change after the best immediate deviation.
Proposition IV.7 (Small δ Regime). In the repeated game under incomplete information, if
δ < δˆthN with i = N in (24), the N platforms will always follow the cooperation profile(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
as unique solutions to
λ˜1(δ) = max
{M ′L −
√
M ′2L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)
(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λ˜i(δ)/µ
)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL ,
M ′H −
√
M ′2H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)
(
1 +
N∑
i=2
λ˜i(δ)/µ
)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH
}
,
λ˜i(δ)−
M ′i −
√√√√M ′2i − ci
(
1 +
( N∑
j=1
λ˜j(δ)− λ˜i(δ)
)
/µ
)
ci
= 0,
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Fig. 4: Cooperation profile (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ)) of the trigger mechanism versus discount factor δ, as
compared to approximate social optimizers (λˆ1, λˆ2) in (20)-(21). Here we have N = 2, δˆth2 = 0.3
and δˆth1 (cL) = 0.7 under parameters cH = 100, cL = 10, pH = 0.1, cˆ1 = 19, c2 = 20 and µ = 0.1
with cˆ1 < c2.
where
M ′L = δ
√√√√1 + N∑
i=2
λ∗i /µ (pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL) + (1− δ)
√√√√(1 + N∑
i=2
λ˜i(δ)/µ
)
cL,
M ′H = δ
√√√√1 + N∑
i=2
λ∗i /µ (pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL) + (1− δ)
√√√√(1 + N∑
i=2
λ˜i(δ)/µ
)
cH ,
M ′i =
√
ci
δ
√√√√1 + (pHλ∗1 (cH) + (1− pH)λ∗1 (cL) + N∑
j=2
λ∗j − λ∗i )/µ+ (1− δ)
√√√√1 + ( N∑
j=1
λ˜j(δ)− λ˜i(δ)
)
/µ
 .
The proof is given in Appendix I. Figure 4 shows an illustrative example of N = 2 platforms,
where the approximate cooperation profile
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ)
)
in Propositions IV.4, IV.6, IV.7 under
our trigger mechanism of non-monetary punishment changes with discount factor δ in all the
three δ regimes. Here the mean cost cˆ1 of platform 1 is less than that of platform 2 with
δˆth1 (cL) = max{δˆth1 (cL), δˆth1 (cH)} and δˆth2 < δˆth1 (cL). In small δ regime, both (λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ))
decrease with δ until δˆth2 = 0.3 with λ˜2(δ) = λˆ2 ideally. In medium δ regime, only λ˜1(δ)
decreases with δ till δˆth1 (cL) = 0.7. Finally, in large δ regime, the profile eventually equals
(λˆ1, λˆ2). As cˆ1 = 19 is slightly smaller than c2 = 20 here, the final profile λˆ1 is close to λˆ2.
Figure 5 considers an arbitrary number N of platforms and empirically shows the social cost
ratio between the approximate trigger mechanism (in large δ regime) and the social optimum
in (8)-(10), pir/pi∗∗, by comparing to the social cost ratio between competition equilibrium in
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(b) Social cost ratio between approximate mechanism and
optimum
Fig. 5: Empirical performance comparison between competition equilibrium, social optimum in
Section II.B, and our approximate mechanism here. Here, we set cH = 1.5, cL = 0.5, pH = 0.5
for platform 1, and symmetric costs c2 = · · · = c6 = pHcH + (1 − pH)cL for the other N − 1
platforms, and µ = 1.
(11)-(13) and the social optimum, pi∗/pi∗∗ without any mechanism design. As N increases,
platforms compete more intensively to over-sample, thus the ratio pi∗/pi∗∗ increases with greater
efficiency loss. However, our approximate mechanism only has mild efficiency loss. Given
only platform 1 with hidden information, relatively we face less information uncertainty as the
total platform number N increases, and the approximate cooperation profile better approaches
the social optimizers. Hence, ratio pir/pi∗∗ decreases. This empricial result is consistent with
Proposition IV.5 in the worst case. Similar to Figure 3 in Section III, with asymmetric unit
sampling costs, our simulations show that social cost ratio between approximate mechanism and
optimum under incomplete information also decreases with δ in small and medium δ regimes,
and keeps constant in large δ regime.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we study the competition among online content platforms in AoI and bandwidth
sharing, and they concern the freshness of their own updates on real-time information instead
of the others’. When all the platforms know each other’s sampling cost, we show that all the
platforms over-sample and cause huge efficiency loss. To remedy the loss, we propose a trigger
mechanism of non-monetary punishment in the repeated game to approach the social optimum.
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We also study the more challenging case where some newly joined platform can hide its cost
information from the other incumbent platforms in the Bayesian game. Perhaps surprisingly, we
show that this platform may get hurt by knowing more information. Accordingly, we redesign
the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to approach the social optimum by ensuring no cheating
from the platform with more information. Extensive simulations show that the mechanism’s
performance improves as we have more incumbent platforms with known cost information.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION II.1
A. Proof of Social Optimizers and the Uniqueness
To show (2) are solutions as social optimizers, note that pi(λ1, · · · , λN) is concave with each
λi due to
∂2pi(λ1,··· ,λN )
∂λ2i
≤ 0, where i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. By using the first-order condition, we have
(2) as the solutions.
Then we want to prove (2) has unique solutions with induction method. When N = 2, (2)
can be rewritten as
λ1(λ2) =
√√√√ 1 + λ2µ
1
λ2µ
+ c1
, (25)
λ2(λ1) =
√√√√ 1 + λ1µ
1
λ1µ
+ c2
. (26)
To show λ1(λ2) in (25) is concave and strictly increasing in λ2, we take the first and second
derivatives of λ1(λ2) as
λ′1(λ2) =
1
2µ
√√√√ 1λ2µ + c1
1 + λ2
µ
·
c1 +
2
λ2µ
+ 1
λ22
( 1
λ2µ
+ c1)2
,
λ′′1(λ2) = −
5c1+1
λ22
+ 2c1+2
λ2µ
+ c1 +
1
λ42
+ 4c1µ
λ32
4µ2( 1
λ2µ
+ c1)
5
2 (1 + λ2
µ
)
3
2
.
Since λ′′1(λ2) < 0, λ
′
1(λ2 = 0)→∞ and λ′1(λ2 →∞) = 0, we know λ′1(λ2) > 0 and λ1(λ2) is
concave and strictly increasing in λ2. Similarly we can show that λ2(λ1) in (26) is concave and
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strictly increasing in λ1. By substituting λ1(λ2) in (25) into λ2(λ1) in (26), we simplify (25)
and (26) as the following equation:
λ2 −
√√√√ 1 + λ1(λ2)µ
1
λ1(λ2)µ
+ c2
= 0. (27)
Since
√
1+
λ1(λ2)
µ
1
λ1(λ2)µ
+c2
in (27) is concave and strictly increasing in λ1(λ2) and λ1(λ2) in (27) is
concave and strictly increasing in λ2, we obtain that
√
1+
λ1(λ2)
µ
1
λ1(λ2)µ
+c2
is concave and strictly increasing
in λ2. To show (27) has only one positive solution, denote g(λ2) = λ2 −
√
1+
λ1(λ2)
µ
1
λ1(λ2)µ
+c2
, where
we know g(λ2) is convex in λ2 because of concavity of
√
1+
λ1(λ2)
µ
1
λ1(λ2)µ
+c2
. Therefore we know g′(λ2)
increases with λ2. Since
g′(λ2 = 0) = 1− λ′2(0) < 0,
g′(λ2 →∞) = 1− λ′2(∞) > 0,
there exists unique a > 0 satisfying g′(a) = 0, then g(λ2) decreases in (0, a] and increases in
(a,∞). Since g(0) = 0 and g(∞)→∞, there exists unique λ∗∗2 > 0 satisfying g(λ∗∗2 ) = 0, thus
(27) has unique positive solution. We plot g(λ2) in Figure 6. Similarly (25) has unique positive
solution λ∗∗1 . The social optimizers in (2) are unique.
Suppose that when N = M − 1, (2) has unique solutions. With induction method, we need
to prove when N = M , (2) has unique solutions. Similar to (25)-(26), we can rewrite λi as a
function of λj and the λi is concave and strictly increasing in each λj , where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and
j 6= i. If we introduce λM as in (25)-(26) into other λi as in (25)-(26), where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M−1},
we have λi is still concave and strictly increasing in λj , where j ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1} and j 6= i.
Since we know when N = M − 1, (2) has unique solutions. Then after introducing λM as in
(25)-(26) into other λi as in (25)-(26), the new M − 1 equations also have unique solutions.
Then we prove that when N = M , (2) has unique solutions.
B. Proof of Competition Equilibrium and the Uniqueness
To show (3) are solutions as equilibrium, note that each pii(λi, λ−i) is concave with each λi
due to ∂
2pii(λi,λ−i)
∂λ2i
≤ 0, where i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. By using the first-order condition, we have (3)
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Fig. 6: g(λ2) versus λ2 in Appendix A.A.
as the solutions.
Then we want to prove (2) has unique solutions with induction method. When N = 2, (3)
can be rewritten as
λ1(λ2) =
√
1 + λ2/µ
c1
, (28)
λ2(λ1) =
√
1 + λ1/µ
c2
, (29)
which are equivalent to the following equation:√
1 + λ1/µ
c2
− µ(c1λ21 − 1) = 0. (30)
Denote f(λ1) =
√
1+λ1/µ
c2
− µ(c1λ21 − 1). To show f(λ1) only has one positive root, we check
the first-order and second-order derivatives of f(λ1) as
f ′(λ1) =
1
2
√
c2µ
√
1
1 + λ1/µ
− 2c1µλ1,
f ′′(λ1) = − 1
4
√
c2µ2
√
1
(1 + λ1/µ)
3
2
− 2c1µ.
Since f ′′(λ1) < 0, f ′(λ1) decreases with λ1. Additionally, since f ′(0) > 0 and f ′(∞) < 0, then
f ′(λ1) has exactly one positive root, denoted as f ′(b) = 0. Then f(λ1) is increasing in (0, b] and
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Fig. 7: f(λ1) versus λ1 in Appendix A.B.
decreasing in (b,∞). Also since
f(0) > 0,
f(∞) < 0,
then f(λ1) has unique positive root λ∗1 satisfying (30). We plot f(λ1) in Figure 7. Therefore λ
∗
2
is unique according to (29) and (3) has unique solutions.
Suppose that when N = M − 1, (3) has unique solutions. With induction method, we need
to prove when N = M , (3) has unique solutions. Similar to (28)-(29), we can rewrite λi as a
function of λj and the λi is concave and strictly increasing in each λj , where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and
j 6= i. If we introduce λM as in (28)-(29) into other λi as in (28)-(29), where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M−1},
we have λi is still concave and strictly increasing in λj , where j ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1} and j 6= i.
Since we know when N = M − 1, (2) has unique solutions. Then after introducing λM as in
(28)-(29) into other λi as in (28)-(29), the new M − 1 equations also have unique solutions.
Then we prove that when N = M , (3) has unique solutions.
Since λ1(λ2) in (25) has an additional item 1λ2µ in the denominator than λ1(λ2) in (28), and
λ2(λ1) in (26) has an additional item 1λ1µ in the denominator than λ2(λ1) in (29), thus solutions
to (25) and (26), (λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 ), are smaller than solutions to (28) and (29), (λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2). Then we have
λ∗i ≥ λ∗∗i , i = 1, 2. For general N ≥ 2, each λi as in (25) has an additional item 1µ
( N∑
j=1
1
λj
− 1
λi
)
30
in the denominator than λi as in (28), thus solutions to (25) and (26) are smaller than solutions
to (28) and (29) when N ≥ 2, we have λ∗i ≥ λ∗∗i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION II.3
A. Proof of Social Optimizers and the Uniqueness
To show (8)-(10) are solutions as social optimizers, note that pi((λ1(cH), λ1(cL)), · · · , λN) is
concave with each λi due to
∂2pi((λ1(cH),λ1(cL)),··· ,λN )
∂λ2i
≤ 0, where i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. By using the
first-order condition, we have (8)-(10) as the solutions. Note that (8)-(10) have the same structure
as (2), we can prove uniqueness of (8)-(10) by following proof of (2) in Appendix A.A. We
thus skip details here.
B. Proof of Competition Equilibrium and the Uniqueness
To show (11)-(13) are solutions as equilibrium, note that each pii(λi, λ−i) is concave with
each λi due to
∂2pii(λi,λ−i)
∂λ2i
≤ 0, where i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. By using the first-order condition, we
have (11)-(13) as the solutions. Note that (11)-(13) have the same structure as (3), we can prove
uniqueness of (11)-(13) by following proof of (3) in Appendix A.B. We thus skip details here.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION II.5
If all the platforms have complete information of platform 1’s sampling cost, they will play a
one-shot game as in (1), we present ((λ¯1(cH), λ¯1(cL)), (λ¯2(cH), λ¯2(cL)), · · · , (λ¯N(cH), λ¯N(cL))),
the Nash equilibrium, as unqiue solutions to
λ¯1(cH) =
√√√√√1 + N∑j=2 λ¯j(cH)/µ
cH
, λ¯i(cH) =
√√√√√1 + ( N∑j=1 λ¯j(cH)− λ¯i(cH))/µ
ci
, i ∈ {2, · · · , N}, (31)
λ¯1(cL) =
√√√√√1 + N∑j=2 λ¯j(cL)/µ
cL
, λ¯i(cL) =
√√√√√1 + ( N∑j=1 λ¯j(cL)− λ¯i(cL))/µ
ci
, i ∈ {2, · · · , N}. (32)
In the following, we first prove platform 1 obtains larger one-shot cost under incomplete
information than that under complete information when c1 = cH , then prove platform 1 can
obtain larger one-shot average cost under incomplete information.
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Platform 1’s one-shot cost when c1 = cH under incomplete information is pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j),
where λ∗1(cH) and λ
∗
j are given in (11)-(13), and its one-shot cost when c1 = cH under complete
information is pi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)) using (31). To prove platform 1 obtains larger one-shot
cost under incomplete information when c1 = cH , it’s equivalent to prove pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) ≥
pi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)). We want to prove the equivalent statement via introducing an interme-
diate term:
pi1(λ
∗
1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) ≥ pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)) ≥ pi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)). (33)
To prove (33), we first prove pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) ≥ pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)). By comparing (11)-
(13) and (31), we have
N∑
j=2
λ∗j ≥
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH). Since pi1(λ1,
N∑
j=2
λj) in (1) increases with
N∑
j=2
λj , we
have pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) ≥ pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)).
We then prove pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)) ≥ pi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)) in (33). According to (31),
the best response λ1 = λ¯1(cH) is the unique solution to minimize platform 1’s one-shot cost
pi1(λ1,
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)), thus pi1(λ∗1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)) ≥ pi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)).
Similar to (33), we can prove
pi1(λ
∗
1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) ≤ pi1(λ¯1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) ≤ pi1(λ¯1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cL)). (34)
Finally, we are ready to prove that platform 1 can obtain larger one-shot average cost under
incomplete information than that under complete information. This time-average cost of platform
1 under complete information is
piC1 = pHpi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH)) + (1− pH)pi1(λ¯1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cL)).
Its average cost under information advantage changes to
piI1 = pHpi1(λ
∗
1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j) + (1− pH)pi1(λ∗1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j),
where λ∗1(cH), λ
∗
1(cL) and λ
∗
j are given in (11)-(13). If platform 1 obtains larger cost under
incomplete information, or piC1 ≤ piI1 , which can be simplified as
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pH ≥
pi1(λ¯1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cL))− pi1(λ∗1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j )
pi1(λ¯1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cL))− pi1(λ∗1(cL),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j ) + pi1(λ
∗
1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ∗j )− pi1(λ¯1(cH),
N∑
j=2
λ¯j(cH))
,
in which the right-hand side is positive and less than 1 because of (33) and (34).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION III.3
To show the equation in Proposition III.3 are the solutions to the cooperation profile, we solve
and rewrite (17) as
λ˜2i (δ)/ci − 2
√√√√
δλ∗i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
λ˜i(δ) + 1 +
λ−i(δ)
µ
= 0,
where λ−i(δ) =
j∑
k=1
λ˜k(δ) − λ˜i(δ) +
N∑
k=j+1
λ∗∗k . We then choose to take the smaller root with
smaller social cost, which is consistent with equation in Proposition III.3.
Notice that the only different between the equation in Proposition III.3. and (19) is that in
latter, λ˜k(δ) = λ∗∗k are constant for k ∈ {j + 1, · · · , N}, while in (19), such λ˜k(δ)s are still
variable to determine. Then we can prove unique solution of the equation in Proposition III.3.
by proving that of (19), which is given in Appendix E.
We rewrite the equation in Proposition III.3 as
λ˜i(δ) = δλ
∗
i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
−
√√√√(
δλ∗i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
)2
− 1 +
λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
. (35)
λ˜i(δ) in (35) decreases with δ due to
∂λ˜i(δ)
∂δ
< 0, where i ∈ {1, · · · , j}. When δ = 0, λ˜i(δ) = λ∗i
in (35). When δ = δthi , λ˜i(δ) = λ
∗∗
i in (35). Thus we prove that λ
∗∗
i < λ˜i(δ) < λ
∗
i and λ˜i(δ)
decreases with δ.
APPENDIX E
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION III.4
To show (19) are the solutions to the cooperation profile, we solve and rewrite (18) as
λ˜2i (δ)/ci − 2
√√√√
δλ∗i + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ−i(δ)
µ
ci
λ˜i(δ) + 1 +
λ−i(δ)
µ
= 0,
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where λ−i(δ) =
N∑
k=1
λ˜k(δ)− λ˜i(δ). We then choose to take the smaller root with smaller social
cost, which is consistent with (19).
We want to show (19) have unique solutions with induction method. When N = 2, we rewrite
(18) as
λ˜21(δ)− 2
(
δλ∗1 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
)
λ˜1(δ) +
1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
= 0, (36)
λ˜22(δ)− 2
(
δλ∗2 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜1(δ)/µ
c2
)
λ˜2(δ) +
1 + λ˜1(δ)/µ
c2
= 0. (37)
Denote
f(λ˜1(δ)) =λ˜
2
1(δ)− 2
(
δλ∗1 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
)
λ˜1(δ) +
1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
.
In the range of λ∗∗2 < λ˜2(δ) < λ
∗
2, symmetric axis of f(λ˜1(δ)) satisfies
λ∗∗1 < δλ
∗
1 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
< λ∗1.
To show f(λ∗∗1 ) > 0, we simplify it as
δ < δ1 =
(
λ∗∗1 −
√
1+λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
)2
2λ∗∗1
(
λ∗1 −
√
1+λ˜2(δ)/µ
c1
) .
Since δ1 increases with λ˜2(δ) ∈ (λ∗∗2 , λ∗2) and when λ˜2(δ) = λ∗∗2 , δ1 = δth1, then δ1 > δth1 always
holds in tits range. Then δ < δ1 always holds because δ < δth1, which means f(λ∗∗1 ) > 0 holds.
Then the smaller positive root of (36) must be in the range of λ∗∗1 < λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
1. Similarly, we
can show that the smaller positive root of (37) is also in the range of λ∗∗2 < λ˜2(δ) < λ
∗
2.
Notice that although (36) and (37) may have multiple roots, we only select the root that has
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smallest social cost, which are the solutions to
λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) = δλ
∗
1 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜2(δ)
µ
c1
−
√√√√(
δλ∗1 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜2(δ)
µ
c1
)2
− 1 +
λ˜2(δ)
µ
c1
,
(38)
λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) = δλ
∗
2 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜1(δ)
µ
c2
−
√√√√(
δλ∗2 + (1− δ)
√
1 + λ˜1(δ)
µ
c2
)2
− 1 +
λ˜1(δ)
µ
c2
.
(39)
We’ve shown the existence of (38) and (39) in previous paragraph. To show (38)-(39) have
unique solutions in the range of λ∗∗1 < λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
1, λ
∗∗
2 < λ˜2(δ) < λ
∗
2, denote
g(λ˜1(δ)) = λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ))− λ˜2(δ)1(λ˜1(δ)),
where λ˜2(δ)1(λ˜1(δ)) is the inverse function to λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) in (38) with variable λ˜1(δ). By taking
first and second derivatives of λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) in (38) and of λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) in (39), we can find that
λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) is convex and strictly increasing in λ˜2(δ), and λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) is convex and strictly
increasing in λ˜1(δ). Thus g(λ˜1(δ)) is convex in λ˜1(δ). Additionally, we have
g(λ∗∗1 ) > 0,
g(λ∗1) = 0,
g′(λ∗1) > 0.
Thus there exists unique λ˜01(δ) in λ
∗∗
1 < λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
1 satisfying g(λ˜
0
1(δ)) = 0. We plot g(λ˜1(δ))
in Figure 8. Then there exist unique solutions to (38) and (39) in the feasible range of λ∗∗1 <
λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
1 and λ
∗∗
2 < λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
2.
Suppose that when N = M − 1, (19) has unique solutions. With induction method, we
need to prove when N = M , (19) has unique solutions. Similar to (38)-(39), we can rewrite
λ˜i(δ) as a function of λ˜j(δ) and the λ˜i(δ) is convex and strictly increasing in each λ˜j(δ), where
i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and j 6= i. If we introduce λ˜M(δ) as in (38)-(39) into other λ˜i(δ) as in (38)-(39),
where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1}, we have λ˜i(δ) is still convex and strictly increasing in λ˜j(δ), where
j ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1} and j 6= i. Since we know when N = M − 1, (19) has unique solutions.
Then after introducing λM as in (38)-(39) into other λi as in (38)-(39), the new M−1 equations
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Fig. 8: g(λ˜1(δ)) versus λ˜1(δ) in Appendix E.
also have unique solutions. Then we prove that when N = M , (19) has unique solutions.
When δ → 0, (19) just becomes (2), then solution to (19) are λ˜i(δ) = λ∗i , where i ∈
{1, · · · , N}.
λ˜i(δ) in (19) decreases with δ due to
∂λ˜i(δ)
∂δ
< 0, where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. Thus solutions to
(19) decrease with δ.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA IV.1
Given c1 = cH , at the social optimum platform 1’s sampling rate is λ1 = λ∗∗1 (cH) with
corresponding cost:
pi1(cH , λ
∗∗
1 (cH)) =
1
λ∗∗1 (cH)
(
1 +
( N∑
i=2
λ∗∗i
)
/µ
)
+ cHλ
∗∗
1 (cH) + 1/µ.
If it cheats to play λ∗∗1 (cL), its cost will be pi1(cH , λ
∗∗
1 (cL)). If pi1(cH , λ
∗∗
1 (cH)) ≤ pi1(cH , λ∗∗1 (cL)),
platform 1 won’t deviate to λ1 = λ∗∗1 (cL), which is equivalent to√√√√cH + 1
µ
N∑
i=2
1
λ∗∗i
√√√√cL + 1
µ
N∑
i=2
1
λ∗∗i
≤ cH ,
which holds only if 1
µ
N∑
i=2
1
λ∗∗i
is small and is not generally true. Then platform 1 may deviate
from λ∗∗1 (cH) to λ
∗∗
1 (cL) when c1 = cH .
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV.5
Before we prove the proposition, let’s first prove an useful lemma.
Lemma G.1. Given real numbers x, y, a, b > 0 and x ≥ y, b ≥ a, x+a
y+b
≤ x
y
.
Proof. Since x, y, a, b are all positive, x+a
y+b
≤ x
y
is equivalent to bx ≥ ay. Then we continue to
prove bx ≥ ay is true, which holds due to given condition x ≥ y > 0, b ≥ a > 0.
When pHcH+(1−pH)cL = c2 = · · · = cN , according to (20)-(21), the approximate cooperation
profile in larger δ regime are
λˆ1 = λˆ2 = · · · = λˆN = 1√
pHcH + (1− pH)cL
.
As the platforms repeat their sampling choices in the social optimum and the mechanism, we only
need to compare their one-shot social costs. The social cost in one-shot under this approximate
cooperation profile is
pir = 2N
√
pHcH + (1− pH)cL +N2/µ.
Since c2 = · · · = cN , according to (8)-(10), we have λ∗∗2 = · · · = λ∗∗N . Then the minimum social
cost in one-shot can be simplified as
pi∗∗ =pH
(
1
λ∗∗1 (cH)
+ cHλ
∗∗
1 (cH)
)
+ (1− pH)
(
1
λ∗∗1 (cL)
+ cLλ
∗∗
1 (cL)
)
+N/µ
+ (N − 1)
(
1
λ∗∗2
+ c2λ
∗∗
2
)
+ (N − 2)(N − 1)/µ
+ (N − 1)pH
(
λ∗∗2
λ∗∗1 (cH)
+
λ∗∗1 (cH)
λ∗∗2
)
+ (N − 1)(1− pH)
(
λ∗∗2
λ∗∗1 (cL)
+
λ∗∗1 (cL)
λ∗∗2
)
.
Then the ratio of social costs under the approximate cooperation profile and social optimizers is
r = max
0≤pH≤1,µ,cH>cL>0
pir
pi∗∗
. (40)
Since both pir and pi∗∗ contain a common term (N + (N − 2)(N − 1))/µ, from Lemma C.1 we
know if we eliminate this term from both pir and pi∗∗, the ratio would just become larger. Thus,
we can rewrite (40) as
r ≤ max
0≤pH≤1,µ,cH>cL>0
2N
√
pHcH + (1− pH)cL + 2N−2µ
m1 +m2
, (41)
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where all the N − 1 platforms behave the same, and
m1 = pH
(
1
λ∗∗1 (cH)
+ cHλ
∗∗
1 (cH)
)
+ (1− pH)
(
1
λ∗∗1 (cL)
+ cLλ
∗∗
1 (cL)
)
+ (N − 1)
(
1
λ∗∗2
+ c2λ
∗∗
2
)
,
m2 = (N − 1)pH
(
λ∗∗2
λ∗∗1 (cH)
+
λ∗∗1 (cH)
λ∗∗2
)
+ (N − 1)(1− pH)
(
λ∗∗2
λ∗∗1 (cL)
+
λ∗∗1 (cL)
λ∗∗2
)
.
Given pH = 0 or pH = 1, pir = pi∗∗ always holds. If 0 < pH < 1, we notice that in m2,
λ∗∗2
λ∗∗1 (cH)
+
λ∗∗1 (cH)
λ∗∗2
≥ 2 and λ∗∗2
λ∗∗1 (cL)
+
λ∗∗1 (cL)
λ∗∗2
≥ 2, where the equalities hold at λ∗∗2 = λ∗∗1 (cH) = λ∗∗1 (cL).
Then we can tell that m2 is minimized at λ∗∗2 = λ
∗∗
1 (cH) = λ
∗∗
1 (cL) with m2 = (2N − 2)/µ.
By using Lemma C.1 again, we eliminate (2N − 2)/µ in the numerator of (41) and m2 in the
denominator and rewrite (41) as
r ≤ max
0<pH<1,µ,cH>cL>0
2N
√
pHcH + (1− pH)cL
m1
. (42)
Now we focus on m1. Inside, 1λ∗∗1 (cH) + cHλ
∗∗
1 (cH) is minimized at λ
∗∗
1 (cH) =
1√
cH
, 1
λ∗∗1 (cL)
+
cLλ
∗∗
1 (cL) is minimized at λ
∗∗
1 (cL) =
1√
cL
and 1
λ∗∗2
+ c2λ
∗∗
2 is minimized at λ
∗∗
2 =
1√
c2
. Thus, m1
is minimized at λ∗∗1 (cH) =
1√
cH
, λ∗∗1 (cL) =
1√
cL
and λ∗∗2 =
1√
c2
= 1√
pHcH+(1−pH)cL
, which only
happen altogether at µ → ∞. Thus, the right-hand side of (42) is maximized at µ → ∞. We
thus simply (42) as
r ≤ max
0<pH<1,cH>cL>0
N
√
pHcH/cL + (1− pH)
pH
√
cH/cL + (1− pH) + (N − 1)
√
pHcH/cL + (1− pH)
. (43)
If we replace cH , cL by x =
√
cH/cL, (43) is simplified to
r ≤ max
0<pH<1,x>1
N
√
pHx2 + (1− pH)
pHx+ (1− pH) + (N − 1)
√
pHx2 + (1− pH)
:= f(x). (44)
We notice that f(x) increases with x > 1 because
f ′(x) =
N(1− pH)pH(x− 1)(
pHx+ (1− pH) + (N − 1)
√
pHx2 + (1− pH)
)2√
pHx2 + 1− pH
> 0.
Thus, the right-hand side of (44) is maximized at x→∞ and we can finally rewrite (44) as
r ≤ lim
x→∞
max
0<pH<1
N
√
pHx2 + (1− pH)
pHx+ (1− pH) + (N − 1)
√
pHx2 + (1− pH)
= max
0<pH<1
N
√
pH
pH + (N − 1)√pH = max0<pH<1
N√
pH +N − 1 <
N
N − 1 .
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APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV.6
To show the equations in Proposition IV.6 are the solutions, we need to solve the following
equations for platform 1
δ = max
{
δˆth1
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)|c1 = cL
)
, δˆth1
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)|c1 = cH
)}
.
(45)
and for platform i ∈ {2, · · · , N}:
δ =
pii
(
λ˜i(δ), λ˜−i(δ)
)
− pii
(
λ˜−i(δ),
√
1+λ˜−i(δ)/µ
ci
)
pii
(
λ∗i , λ
∗
−i
)− pii(λ˜−i(δ),√1+λ˜−i(δ)/µci ) . (46)
where λ˜−i(δ) =
N∑
j 6=i
λ˜j(δ) and λ∗−i =
N∑
m 6=i,1
λ∗m+pHλ
∗
1 (cH)+(1− pH)λ∗1 (cL). By jointly solving
(45) and (46) and taking the smaller roots to avoid large social cost, we have the following
cooperation
(
λ˜1(δ), λ˜2(δ), · · · , λ˜N(δ)
)
for all the N platforms as in Proposition IV.6.
Notice that the only different between the equations in Proposition IV.6 and Proposition IV.7
is that in the equations in Proposition IV.6, λ˜k(δ) = λˆk are constant for k ∈ {j, · · · , N}, while
in the equations in Proposition IV.7, such λ˜k(δ)s are still variable to determine. Then we can
prove unique solution of the equations in Proposition IV.6 by proving that of the equations in
Proposition IV.7, which is given in Appendix I.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV.7
Platform 1 should not deviate with λ˜1(δ) whether c1 = cH or c1 = cL and platform i =
2, 3, · · · , N should not deviate with λ˜i(δ), which are equivalent to
δ ≥ δˆth1 (λ˜1(δ),
N∑
j=2
λ˜j(δ)|c1 = cL), δ ≥ δˆth1 (λ˜1(δ),
N∑
j=2
λ˜j|c1 = cH), δ ≥ δˆthi (
N∑
j 6=i
λ˜j(δ)). (47)
Solutions to (47) are
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λ˜1(δ) ∈
[M ′L −
√
M2
′
L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL ,
M ′L +
√
M
′2
L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL
]
,
(48)
λ˜1(δ) ∈
[M ′H −
√
M
′2
H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH ,
M ′H +
√
M
′2
H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH
]
,
λ˜i(δ) ∈
[Mi −
√
M2i − ci(1 +
N∑
j 6=i
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
ci
,
Mi +
√
M2i − ci(1 + λ˜1(δ)/µ)
ci
]
, (49)
where
M ′k = δ
√√√√1 + N∑
j=2
λ∗j/µ(pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√ck) + (1− δ)
√√√√(1 + N∑
j 6=i
λ˜j(δ))ck, k ∈ {H,L},
Mi =
√
ci
(
δ
√√√√1 + (pHλ∗1(cH) + (1− pH)λ∗1(cL) + N∑
j 6=i,1
λ∗j )/µ+ (1− δ)
√√√√1 + N∑
j 6=i
λ˜j(δ)/µ
)
, i = 2, 3, · · · , N.
Interaction of (48) and (49) is the feasible region for desired λ˜1(δ), which is
λ˜1(δ) ∈
[
max
{M ′L −√M ′2L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL ,
M ′H −
√
M
′2
H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH
}
,
min
{M ′L +√M ′2L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL ,
M ′H +
√
M
′2
H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH
}]
.
(50)
To avoid large social cost, we then take the smallest feasible solutions in (50) as
λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) =
M ′k −
√
M
′2
k − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cj)(1 +
N∑
j=2
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cj , (51)
λ˜i(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) =
Mi −
√
M2i − ci(1 +
N∑
j 6=i,1
λ˜j(δ)/µ)
ci
, i = 2, 3, · · · , N, (52)
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where
M ′k = δ
√√√√1 + N∑
j=2
λ∗j/µ(pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√ck) + (1− δ)
√√√√(1 + N∑
j 6=i
λ˜j(δ))ck, k ∈ {H,L},
which is the same as the equations in Proposition IV.7. We want to use induction method to
show (51)-(52) have unique solutions. When N = 2, (51)-(52) are equivalent to
λ˜1(δ) = max
{M ′L −√M ′2L − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cL ,
M ′H −
√
M
′2
H − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cH
}
, (53)
λ˜2(δ) =
M2 −
√
M22 − c2(1 + λ˜1(δ)/µ)
c2
. (54)
We rewrite (53)-(54) as
λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) =
M ′j −
√
M
′2
j − (δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cj)(1 + λ˜2(δ)/µ)
δcˆ1 + (1− δ)cj , (55)
λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) =
M2 −
√
M22 − c2(1 + λ˜1(δ)/µ)
c2
, (56)
where
M ′j = δ
√
1 + λ∗2/µ(pH
√
cH + (1− pH)√cL) + (1− δ)
√
(1 + λ˜2(δ))cj.
To show (55)-(56) have unique solutions in the range of λˆ1 < λ˜1(δ) < λ∗1(cj), λˆ2 < λ˜2(δ) < λ
∗
2,
denote
g(λ˜1(δ)) = λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ))− λ˜2(δ)1(λ˜1(δ)),
where λ˜2(δ)1(λ˜1(δ)) is the inverse function to λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) in (55) with variable λ˜1(δ). By taking
first-order and second-order derivatives of λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) in (55) and of λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) in (56), we
can find that λ˜1(δ)(λ˜2(δ)) is convex and strictly increasing in λ˜2(δ), and λ˜2(δ)(λ˜1(δ)) is convex
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Fig. 9: g(λ˜1(δ)) versus λ˜1(δ) in Appendix I.
and strictly increasing in λ˜1(δ). Thus g(λ˜1(δ)) is convex in λ˜1(δ). Additionally, we have
g(λˆ1) > 0,
g(λ∗1(cj)) < 0,
g′(λ∗1(cj)) > 0.
Thus there exists unique λ˜01(δ) in λˆ1 < λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
1(cj) satisfying g(λ˜
0
1(δ)) = 0. We plot
g(λ˜1(δ)) in Figure 9. Then there exist unique solutions to (53) and (54) in the feasible range of
λˆ1 < λ˜1(δ) < λ
∗
1(cj) and λˆ2 < λ˜2(δ) < λ
∗
2.
Suppose that when N = M − 1, the equations in Proposition IV.7 have unique solutions.
With induction method, we need to prove when N = M , the equations in Proposition IV.7 have
unique solutions. Similar to (55)-(56), we can rewrite λ˜i(δ) as a function of λ˜j(δ) and the λ˜i(δ)
is convex and strictly increasing in each λ˜j(δ), where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and j 6= i. If we introduce
λ˜M(δ) as in (55)-(56) into other λ˜i(δ) as in (55)-(56), where i ∈ {1, · · · ,M −1}, we have λ˜i(δ)
is still convex and strictly increasing in λ˜j(δ), where j ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1} and j 6= i. Since we
know when N = M − 1, the equations in Proposition IV.7 have unique solutions. Then after
introducing λM as in (55)-(56) into other λi as in (55)-(56), the new M − 1 equations also have
unique solutions. Then we prove that when N = M , the equations in Proposition IV.7 have
unique solutions.
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